ABSTRACT We study how to make any deterministic encryption scheme probabilistic and secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. A new transpositional padding encryption scheme is proposed, with which we construct a universal scheme, namely, a transpositional padding encryption scheme, which has three novel attributes: 1) it can pad a given plaintext into several different values once the randomness is chosen while the previous padding schemes only pad a given plaintext into a fixed value; 2) it introduces the randomness into a ciphertext without employing hash function or random oracle, and; 3) it enables the encrypted message to contain more useful information that may exceed the upper limit of plaintext space. Then, we give this encryption scheme an instantiation of RSA, which is proven to be indistinguishable under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks without random oracle that assumes a variant of the standard RSA problem. The variant problem is a novel arithmetic problem, and it is weaker than the standard RSA problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deterministic public-key encryption schemes [1] always produces the same ciphertexts when it is used to encrypt a given plaintext for a given public key, even if the encryption algorithm is executed separately more than one time. Generally speaking, the deterministic public-key encryption schemes are more efficient than other public encryption schemes. Many deterministic public-key encryption schemes are widely used to provide privacy and to ensure authenticity for the internet users. For instance, RSA [2] is still deployed in many e-commercial systems [3] - [10] nowadays. However, one of the drawbacks of the deterministic encryptions is the possibility of leaking partial information to the adversaries, i.e., for a given key, if an adversary has gotten some ciphertexts and their corresponding plaintexts, he can recover partial even all information of the plaintext m from a new ciphertext, which is also encrypted by the given key.
In order to improve the security performance of the deterministic public-key encryption schemes, researchers proposed to transform the deterministic encryption schemes to the probabilistic ones by introducing randomness into ciphertexts. Using this method, an deterministic encryption scheme can encrypt a given plaintext into one element of many possible ciphertexts, which looks like one element chosen randomly from these ciphertexts. Thus, this method can keep an adversary from recovering some bits of a challenge plaintext through its corresponding ciphertext (which is evaluated using the pairs of plaintext-ciphertext gained by the adversary).
It is important for the users who care about their privacy to know what security level can be obtained by a method that is used to transform any deterministic encryption scheme to a probabilistic one. A preferable transforming method should be able to provide sufficiently strong guarantees on privacy protection such that (1) leaking partial information to the adversaries becomes infeasible; (2) the adversaries cannot correlate any two encryptions of the same message, or correlate a message to its ciphertext, even if accessed to the public encryption key. In other words, a preferable transforming method should be able to make any deterministic encryption scheme to be with the indistinguishable security, which is defined by Shafi and Micali [11] . Indistinguishable security, even in the scenario that chosen plaintext attack, CPA, implies probabilistic encryption. That is, given a plaintext, as different randomness is introduced into encryption, it should be encrypted into variable ciphertexts under a fixed public key.
Although CPA security provides a guarantee on preventing attacks from the completely passive adversaries, no guarantee on the privacy is provided when the attacks from an adversary mount to active attack. To cope with the active attacks, Naor and Yung [12] proposed a security primitive that provides a guarantee on being against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2).
The study on what security level a deterministic publickey encryption provides is initiated by Bellare et al. [1] . Bellare et al. [13] provided the 'strongest possible' security level for the random oracle model by introducing randomness into encryption algorithm. Modifying a deterministic scheme, Boldyreva et al. [14] developed a chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure probabilistic scheme without random oracles. In 2012, by introducing a meaningful level of security to privacy protection, Mironov et al. [15] presented an approach to model the incrementality of deterministic public-key encryption. In 2013, Fuller et al. [16] developed a deterministic public-key encryption scheme, which provides meaningful security if and only if the source of randomness in the encryption process comes with the plaintext itself. Brakerski and Segev [17] formalized a framework that focuses on hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs to study what security level a deterministic public-key encryption scheme provides. A lot of researchers focused on constructing deterministic publickey encryption schemes, among which some schemes employ very novel methods, such as schemes proposed in [16] - [20] .
Although the deterministic encryption schemes mentioned above are practically important in searching of encrypted data, they can never amount to the level of semantical security. In addition, finding a general and efficient method to transform any deterministic encryption scheme to a probabilistic one with CCA2 security in the standard model was still an important and open problem. Particularly,it is urgent to address how to transform the RSA cryptosystem to a probabilistic one without random oracle but with CCA2 security.
As a deterministic cryptosystem, for having high efficiency, RSA remains one of the most popular determinist public-key encryption scheme. The padding mechanism is critical and widely adopted to help RSA achieve a higher security level in encrypting messages [21] - [27] .
Although these variants of RSA are practically important, they still exhibit some inherent drawbacks:
(1) All the schemes mentioned above adopted the optimal asymmetric padding method which needs padding at least k bits of redundant information in one ciphertext to achieve plaintext awareness. Hence, at most n − k (n is the upper limit of the plaintext space) bits of useful information is included in a ciphertext, which is encrypted with the optimal asymmetric padding method. (2) All the padding-based RSA-type schemes mentioned above can be against CCA2 in the random oracle model [28] , except that [26] can be against CPA in the standard model (under appropriate assumptions on the hash functions used to instantiate OAEP). In addition, as proved by Kiltz and Pietrzak [29] , any RSA-OAEP based on the standard RSA problem cannot be secure against CCA2 in the standard model. Our Contributions: We construct a universal mechanism that can bring enough plaintext awareness for any deterministic encryption scheme. During this construction, we focus on the following aspects:
• Developing a newly padding method that can pad a given plaintext into several different values once the randomness is chosen while the previous method that can only pad a given plaintext into one padding result.
• Obtaining indistinguishable (or semantic) security under CCA2 without random oracle, i.e., the randomness introduced into a ciphertext no longer employ hash function or random oracle.
• Enabling the encrypted message to contain more useful information that may exceed the upper limit of plaintext space or ciphertext space. We then give this encryption scheme an instantiation of RSA, which is based on a newly arithmetic problem related to the RSA problem but it is weaker than the standard RSA problem.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF ARITHMETIC
For given integer a, a ≥ 2, there exists a unique factorization such that
where the p i are distinct primes, p i < p i+1 , and at least one of the α i is a nonzero positive integer.
B. GÖDEL NUMBER
Davis et al. [30] defined Gödel number of a sequence (α 1 , α 2 , · · · , α s ) as a number such that Davis et al. [30] put forward that this result is an immediate consequence of the uniqueness of the factorization of integers into primes, which is also referred as the unique factorization theorem or the fundamental theorem of arithmetic. (For a proof, see any elementary number theory textbook.)
C. PADDING-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
According to Kiltz and Pietrzak [29] , a padding-based encryption (PBE) scheme is defined as follows. Assume that g is a public injective transformation, m is a message from the plaintext space, r is a randomness, f is a trapdoor permutation, and ⊥ is a special rejection symbol. A PBE scheme first applies g to m and r, i.e., g(m, r), and then f to g(m, r), i.e., Enc(m, r) = f (g(m, r)). The decryption algorithm inverts f (g(m, r)) and an inverse transformation g of g to reconstruct m (or output '⊥'), i.e., Dec(c) = g (f −1 (c)). Note that = (g, g ) satisfies the consistency requirement i.e., g (g(m, r)) = m.
D. COLLISION-RESISTANT HASH FUNCTIONS
Assume that H is a hash function set, H (•) (where '•' stands for any input) is a function extracting uniformly from H, and x, y are two different variables. H is a collision-resistant hash function only if computing H (x) is easy, but finding two different variables x and y that satisfy H (x) = H (y) is difficult. According to [31] , hash function set has a weaker notion. Hash function set is a universal family composed one-way hash functions. For an adversary, to extract a H (•) uniformly from H and find a different input y such that H (x) = H (y) is infeasible, where x is selected by the adversary itself. Such a hash function family is also defined as target collision resistant hash function set. See [32] for recent results and further discussion.
E. SECURE GAMES
Assume that a public encryption scheme is defined by , a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is defined by A, and the security parameter of the public encryption scheme is defined by k. According to [33] , the indistinguishable games under IND-CPA and IND-CCA2 should be defined as follows.
The IND-CPA game PubK cpa A, (k): 1) Given a security parameter 1 k , the challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate all system parameters, and delivers K pub to the adversary but keeps K pri in private. 2) Having K pub , the adversary A can access to an encryption oracle Enc K pub (·) (issue arbitrary queries to an 'encryption oracle'). Once A decides to terminate its access to and delivers C to A.
4)
A can continue to access to Enc K pub (·) (issue queries to an 'encryption oracle'). Once A gives up its access then it outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1} on b. 5) If b = b, the result of the game is 1, otherwise it is 0.
In case, PubK cpa A, (k) = 1, we say that A succeeds. If a negligible function δ(k) exists and satisfies that
the is defined as an encryption scheme with semantical secure under adaptive chosen plaintext attacks.
The IND-CCA2 game PubK cca2 A, (k): 1) Given a security parameter 1 k , the challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate all system parameters, and delivers K pub to the adversary but keeps K pri in private. 2) Except for having K pub , A has an access to a decryption oracle Dec K pri (·) ( make arbitrary queries to a 'decryption oracle'). Once A decides to terminate its access to Enc K pub (·) then it outputs two messages m 0 , m 1 such 
the is defined as an encryption scheme with semantical secure under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
III. UNIVERSAL TRANSPOSITIONAL PADDING ENCRYPTION SCHEMES A. GÖDEL ENCODING
There are several methods that can be used to encode a number into Gödel encoding, such as short division, circuits, Pollard rho factorization and even cloud outsourcing. Here we give an algorithm (see Algorithm 1) based on short division and Pollard rho factorization method.
B. TRANSPOSITIONAL PADDING
Suppose that there is an original sequence S OR = (α 1 , α 2 , · · · , α i , · · · , α s ), where each α i is an integer between 0 and n − 1. The transpositional padding (TP) is defined as a process to develop a new sequence:
by two steps as follows.
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Algorithm 1 Encode(x,N)-Encoding a Number Into a Gödel Sequence
Input: a number x < N .
2: T ← true; 3: for each i ≤ x and p i do 4: if x = x then 5: if min
end if 9: end if 10: s ← i; 11: end for 12: 
r h ∈ Z n at random and lays them at the rear of S OR using the following way: 
C. TP USED FOR ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
For convenience and without loss of generality, we only show how to use TP for encryption when padding one number to a sequence. In this case, an encryption scheme using transpositional padding method develops through the following steps: 1) Encodes the message M as Gödel numbers:
and generates a Gödel sequence of plaintext M :
2) Selects a random number r ∈ Z n and creates a sequence:
by laying r at the end of S OR ; 3) Creates a sequence S L α i = (1, 2, · · · , i · · · , s + 1) with the subscript of α i in sequence S OR+r ; 4) Implements uniform TP operation on the S OR+r and S L α i , and forms their respective stochastic transpositions:
Concatenates all the elements of π (1) such that
6) Concatenates all the elements of π (2) such that
Chooses some encryption scheme to encrypt R TP , and denotes the ciphertext of R TP as c * ; 8) Evaluates α = H (r , c , c * ), and outputs the ciphertext c = (c , c * , α); 9) Decrypts c * using the decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption scheme chosen in step 8, and obtains the TP massage R TP ; 10) De-concatenates c and R TP , thereout, recovers the original sequence S OR ; 11) Recovers the original message M by
D. INSTANTIATING TP ENCRYPTION SCHEME OF RSA
By applying Gödel numbers encoding and TP to RSA [2] , we develop a RSA-type scheme which is defined as RSA-based TP encryption scheme that involves six random algorithms: Key Generate, Gödel Encode, TP, Encrypt, Decrypt, Message Recover, which is denoted by
We describe this scheme in Fig 1: 
IV. DECISIONAL TP-RSA PROBLEM
The general idea of decisional TP-RSA problem is to decide which one is selected uniformly from Z N =pq at random and which one is computed from TP, between r and (R TP ) e mod n. Formally, assume that R TP is the result developed from plaintext M by seven successive steps described as steps 1)∼ 7) in section III-C, D is a polynomial distinguisher, and D Ran , D Rtp are two distributions: 
where D(n, R) ∈ {D Ran , D Rtp }, and k is the security parameter of the TP-RSA scheme.
We say the decisional TP-RSA problem is intractable for any probabilistic algorithm D in polynomial-time if a negligible function (δ(k)) exists and satisfies that
Theorem 1: The decisional TP-RSA problem is as intractable as RSA prolem.
Proof: Recall that R TP is developed in section III-D as the following steps:
(1) Encodes the message M into Gödel numbers such that
and obtains the Gödel sequence (α 1 , α 2 , · · · , α s ) of plaintext M ; (2) Selects a random number r ∈ Z n and creates a sequence(α 1 , α 2 , · · · , α s , α s+1 ) by laying r at the rear of S OR :
with the subscript of α i in sequence S OR+r ; (4) Implements TP operation in the S OR+r and S L α i uniformly, and thereby forms their respective stochastic transpositions:
Concatenates all the elements of π (2) such that
This implies that R TP is generated by stochastic transposition from a random number r ∈ Z N , and (R TP ) e (mod N ) that distributes uniformly in Z N . So D Ran and D Rtp are two identical distributions, in the view of distinguisher D, unless D can solve the RSA problem. In fact, there is no algorithm that can solve RSA problem in polynomial time on non-quantum computers. Consequently, the decisional TP-RSA problem is as intractable as RSA prolem.
V. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we show that the developed scheme E is secure against CCA2 in light of a logic as follows. We first reduce the higher security(IND-CCA2) of scheme E to its lower security(IND-CPA). Then we reduce its lower security to the decisional TP-RSA problem. In other words, we show that if E cannot be against CCA2 then it cannot be against CPA either, if E cannot be against CPA then we can employ E as a subroutine to construct an algorithm that can be used to solve the TP-RSA problem, which implies that RSA problem is feasible to solve, which contradicts the facts.
A. SECURITY ON CPA
We prove that our scheme E has indistinguishability in the presence both of an eavesdropper and active attacker, which implies that it is IND-CPA secure by the security definition in [11] .
Theorem 2: If the decisional TP-RSA problem is intractable, E is an encryption scheme with indistinguishable security under the adaptive CPA.
Proof: Recall that the challenger of the decisional TP-RSA runs in the following ways: runs G(1 n ) to generate (e, N ); uniformly chooses a random number r ∈ Z n and a f ∈ {0, 1}; if f = 0 sets R = (R M TP ), otherwise sets R = R; and finally, delivers (e, N , (N , R) ) to adversary A.
Assume that E = (KGen, GEnc, TP, Enc, Dec, MRec) is our TP encryption scheme, A denotes a polynomial-time adversary attacking E, and δ denotes its succeeding advantage in the IND-CPA security game. We can use algorithm A as a subroutine to construct an algorithm that is used to solve the decisional TP-RSA problem via the following way. Composed of the polynomial-time algorithms A and G(1 n ), B is also a polynomial-time algorithm. By the Bayes Theorem, the probability that B wins the decisional TP-RSA security game can be computed as follows.
When it comes with f = 0, the decisional TP-RSA challenger will set R to be R M b TP . In this case, the view presented to A by B is identical to the view of A in the actual IND-CPA security game. Hence, condition on f = 0, the probability of b = b is equal to what A wins the IND-CPA security game i.e.,
When it comes with f = 1, the decisional TP-RSA challenger will set R to be R. Because R is uniformly picked from Z n , it follows that (R M b TP ) e−1 · R (mod N ) distributes uniformly on Z /NZ . Moreover, the random variables M 0 , M 1 , R M 0 TP , R M 1 TP and b are jointly independent. Therefore, pk and c * do not disclose any information about b, and the guess b about b must be independent of b. Since the probabilities of b being 0 and 1 are 1 2 respectively, it follows that
Combining all the three equations (1), (2) and (3), we have
Thus, the advantage that B succeeds in the decisional TP-RSA security can be calculated as
As we have showed that decisional TP-RSA problem is intractable, B can succeed only with a negligible advantage in the decisional TP-RSA security game, which means that δ 2 must be a negligible value. It follows immediately that δ must be also a negligible value. Therefore, algorithm A can win the IND-CPA game only with a negligible advantage.
B. SECURITY ON CCA2
Theorem 3: If scheme E is secure under CPA, and H (·) is a collision-resistant hash fuction, E is an indistinguishable encryption scheme with CCA2 security.
Proof: We prove this theorem according to the logic below. Since H (·) is collision-resistant, α can be viewed as the unique fingerprint of (r , c , c * ), and all the queries issued to the decryption oracle are viewed to be invalid, unless these queries were previously ciphertexts obtained by the adversary from its encryption oracle. In this case, because the response does not need the decryption oracle at all, E's CCA2 security is reduced to its IND-CPA security. More specifically, we first show that the queries issued to the decryption oracle by the adversary are valid only with a negligible probability, unless those queries were previously generated by the encryption oracle. Given this claim, we then show that if E is not secure against CCA2, but neither is it secure against CPA. It follows from the fact that any adversary amounting to CPA in a scheme with IND-CPA security can actually simulate a decryption oracle for a CCA2 adversary, but it makes the CCA2 adversary feel no gaps. This is because all the simulation works via the following way: (1) returning 'rejection' if the issued ciphertexts were never queried before; (2) returning the appropriate message corresponding to the queries if the ciphertexts were queried before(or evaluated by the encryption oracle). The validity of the simulation follows from Claim 1 and Claim 2. We now conduct the formal proof.
Let A be any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary carrying out CCA2 on E. Define ValidQuery as the event that in the game PubK cca2
A,E (k). In order to succeed, A has to generate a query (c , c * ) to the decryption oracle, where (c , c * ) are not the previous ones generated by the encryption oracle. However, when it comes to the following cases
Selects a random number r , Selects two random numbers r 1 , r 2 to substitute c , c * respectively, Evaluates α = H (r , r 1 , r 2 ), The ciphertext is c = (r 1 , r 2 , α ) . Intuitively, this comes from the fact that if the event ValidQuery occurs (with the premise that H (·) is collisionresistant), A then successfully forges a valid unique fingerprint for (r , c , c * ). This implies that A finds out a (r , c , c * ) such that H (r , c , c * ) = H (r , c , c * ). We argue that if such a case appears with a non-negligible probability, it follows that H (·) is not universal one-way at all, which contradicts the fact that H (·) is a hash function selected uniformly from the universal one-way family of hash functions.
Therefore, the i th invalid ciphertext issued by A will be rejected with a probability at least 1 − 1/(q(n) − i + 1), where i ∈ Z q(n) and the polynomial q(n) is an upper-bound of oracle queries issued by A. This implies that only except for a negligible probability, the decryption oracle cannot accept any invalid ciphertexts, i.e.,
It makes sense that ValidQuery occurs except a negligible probability, i.e.,
Pr[ValidQuery] ≤ δ(n).
Claim 2: There exists a negligible value δ (n) satisfying that Pr PubK cca2
A,E (n) = 1 ∧ ValidQuery ≤ 1 2 + δ (n). We assume that A is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary for PubK cca2
A,E , and A E is an adversary carrying out CPA on E. In the following, we employ A to construct the adversary A E for the CPA experiment with E.
Adversary A E selects (e, N ) ← {0, 1} n and calls A. Whenever A issues an encryption query for m, A E works as follows:
1) Selects (e, N ) ← {0, 1} n .
2) Invokes the CCA2 adversary A; Adversary A E then simulates the encryption oracle for A in the way that using key pair (e, N ). When A issues the query to the encryption oracle for m, A E answers as follows.
a) turns to issue this query to the encryption oracle, and gets a reply (c , c * ); b) choose a random number r ; c) computes α ← H (r , c , c * ), and delivers (c , c * , α) to A; When A issues (c , c * , α) to the decryption oracle, A E answers as follows. If (c , c * , α) was ever generated from an encryption query, then returns m. Else, outputs ''rejection''. 3) As the adversay A outputs a message pair (m 0 , m 1 ), the adversary A E also outputs (m 0 , m 1 ), and A E then receives the challenge ciphertext c * . A E computes α ← H (r , c , c * ), and delivers (c , c * , α) that acts as the the challenge ciphertext to A. As above, A E proceeds with handing (c , c * , α)(acts as the challenge ciphertext) to A, where α = H (r , c , c * ). Notice that for any new query issued by A, the adversary A E only needs to responses with '⊥', i.e., A E does not need to turn to a decryption oracle. This implies that any new query issued by A is treated as invalid by A E . In addition, the adversary A E runs in a probabilistic polynomial-time because it just calls A, and α = H (r , c , c * ) can be evaluated in a probabilistic polynomial-time. Therefore, it is straightforward to see that when the event ValidQuery does not appear, the probability that the adversary A E succeeds in the security game PubK cpa A E ,E equals to the probability that A succeeds in the security game PubK cca2
A,E . That is,
A,E (n) = 1 ∧ ValidQuery], which implies that
A,E (n) = 1∧ValidQuery]. Since E has been proven to be a scheme with indistinguishable security under CPA in A of Section V, there must exist a negligible value δ (n) such that
Consequently,
Obviously, δ(n) + δ (n) is a negligible value, value, since we have shown both δ (n) and δ(n) are negligible values in A of Section V. Hence, it follows that the adversary A succeeds only with a negligible advantage in the security game PubK cca2 A,E . To conclude, E is an encryption scheme with semantical security against CCA2.
C. ADVANTAGES ANALYSIS
Compared to some other padding methods(OAEP, OAEP+, OAEP++) that transform a deterministic encryption scheme to a probabilistic one, our padding way (TP) has three advantages as follows (A simple and clear comparison, as shown in Tab 1).
1 In terms of security, our TP scheme only uses simple transposition to make a deterministic encryption scheme achieve plaintext awareness while OAEP, OAEP+ and OAEP++ need complex hash-net operations(simply denoted by PA-HNO); and to make a deterministic encryption scheme achieve CCA2 security, our TP scheme only relies on the selected randomness, as opposed to OAEP, OAEP+ and OAEP++ that heavily rely on random oracle(simply denoted by CCA2-No-RO). 2 For the same length of plaintext, including the introduced random number(s), TP enables an encryption operation to carry more useful information that may exceed the upper limit of plaintext space or ciphertext space while OAEP, OAEP+ and OAEP++ enable an encryption operation to carry useful information that is k bits smaller than the upper limit of plaintext space or ciphertext space (k is the length of the random number that these schemes are used to fill)(simply denoted by CUI-E-UPL). 3 Regarding the padding effect, compared to OAEP, OAEP+ and OAEP++ that can only pad a given plaintext into one padding result with the selected randomness, our TP scheme can pad the plaintext into several different values(simply denoted by GPSR-P-DV).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a universal encryption scheme with a novel property that can transform any deterministic encryption scheme to a probabilistic one. An instantiation of RSA to this universal encryption scheme is constructed. This example of RSA is proved semantically indistinguishable under CCA2. In addition, a new arithmetic problem related to RSA, defined as decisional TP-RSA, is put forward. 
